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PICTURE OF THE DAY
PIC OF THE DAY ARCHIVES
2007 - 77
Photographs
2008 - 101
Photographs
2009 - 124
Photographs
2010 - 118
Photographs
2011 - 100
Photographs
2012
- 97 Photographs
SHIP INFORMATION
FLEET LISTS
EUROPE PAGE 1
Acergy, Active, Acomarit,
Aries Offshore, Arctia, Arktik-
more, Bibby, Boa, Branding,
BUE, Boston Putford, Bourbon Offshore, Deep Sea Supply, DOF, Eide, Eidsurf,
Eidesvik, ER Schiffart
EUROPE PAGE 2
Esvagt, Fairmount, Fairplay, Farstad,
Femco, Fletcher Shipping, Fratelli d'Amato, Geoconsult, Gulf Offshore,
Harmsbergung, Harrisons, Hartmann, Havila
EUROPE PAGE 3
Heerema, Island Offshore, JP Knight, K
Line, Lauritzen Offshore, Maersk Supply, Marine Subsea, ITC, Noorhoek, Nordane,
Mokster/Eidesvik, Myklebusthaug, North Star, Nomis, O.H.Meling, Olympic
Shipping, OOC Offshore, Ostensjo Rederi, Petrobaltic, REM Offshore, Sartor
Shipping
EUROPE PAGE 4
Sea Mar Shipping, Sealion, Siem Offshore,
Simon Mokster, SMS, Solstad Offshore, TFDS, Telco, Trico, Varada, Viking Supply
Ships, Vroon
S. ATLANTIC
& CARRIBEAN
Astro Maritima, Bourbon Maritima, CBO,
Delba Maritima, Finarge Brasil, Gulf Brasil, GulfMark Trinidad, Norskan,
Saveiros Camuyrano, Sea Trucks Group
INDIA
Garware, Greatship India, Great Offshore,
Procyon Offshore, Varun Shipping
NORTH AMERICA
PAGE 1
Abdon Callais, Atlantic Towing,
Boluda, C&G Boats, Deepocean, Edison Chouest, Harvey Gulf Marine, Hornbeck, L&M
Botruc, Naviera B Tamaulipas, Oddyssea, OIL, Otto Candies, Rowan, Seacor, Sea
Nar Inc, Secunda, Tidewater.
NORTH AMERICA PAGE 2
Trico Marine
FAR EAST & AUSTRALIA
Alam Maritim, Allied Marine,
Britoil, CH Offshore, Go Offshore, Hallin, Huawei Offshore, IOS, Jaya Holdings,
Mermaid Marine, NOR Offshore, Petra Perdana, Swire Pacific,
MED & MIDDLE EAST
Adams, Augusta, Augustea, Brodospas, EDT
Offshore, Finarge Genova, Five Oceans Salvage, Mar Sol, MCT, Med Offshore, NJSC
Chornomornaftogaz, Portosalvo, Remolques Maritimos, Seaways International,
FEATURES
DEEPWATER HORIZON
ACCIDENTS
OPERATIONS
SAFETY
TECHNICAL
CREATIVE WRITING
GENERAL INTEREST
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
NEWS AND VIEWS
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
PUBLICATIONS
THE HISTORY OF THE
SUPPLY SHIP
SUPPLY SHIP OPERATIONS
THE ABERDEEN
WEBCAM
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FEATURES
DEEPWATER
HORIZON
Deepwater Horizon -
What Have we Done to Deserve This
Deepwater Horizon -
After the BP Report
Deepwater Horizon -
The Investigation
The Deepwater Horizon
and the Late MMS.
The Deepwater Horizon
- PR and Politics
The Deepwater Horizon
- Forces at Work
The Deepwater Horizon
- Where Are We Now?
ROVs, Risers and
Mud
The Deepwater Horizon
- Later
Something about the
Deepwater Horizon Accident
Channelling
the Oil Leak
Preventing Fires and Explosions on Offshore
Installations
ACCIDENTS
The Costa Concordia
Grounding
The Loss of the Normand
Rough
The
Bourbon Dolphin Accident
The Loss of the Stevns
Power
Another Marine Disaster
Something About the P36
The Cormorant Alpha Accident
The Loss of the Ocean
Express
OPERATIONS
The Life of the Oil Mariner
Offshore Technology and the
Kursk
The Sovereign Explorer and the
Black Marlin
SAFETY
Safety Case Development
The ALARP
Demonstration
PFEER, DCR and Verification
PFEER and the Dacon Scoop
Human Error and Heavy
Weather Damage
Lifeboats & Offshore
Installations
More about PFEER
The Offshore Safety Regime - Fit
for the Next Decade
The Safety Case and its
Future
Jigsaw
Collision Risk Management
Shuttle Tanker Collisions
A Good Prospect of Recovery
TECHNICAL
The History of the UT 704
The Peterhead Connection
Goodbye Kiss
Uses for New Ships
Supporting Deepwater Drilling
Jack-up Moving - An Overview
Seismic Surveying
Breaking the Ice
Tank Cleaning and the Environment
More about Mud Tank Cleaning
Datatrac
Tank Cleaning in 2004
Glossary of Terms
CREATIVE
WRITING
An Unusual Investigation
Gaia and Oil Pollution
The True
Price of Oil
Icebergs and
Anchor-Handlers
Atlantic SOS
The Greatest Influence
How It Used to Be
Homemade Pizza
Goodbye Far Turbot
The Ship Manager
Running Aground
A Cook's Tale
Navigating the Channel
The Captain's
Letter
GENERAL
INTEREST
The Sealaunch Project
Ghost Ships of Hartlepool
Beam Him Up Scotty
Q790
The Bilbao OSV Conference
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SOMETHING ABOUT THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
ACCIDENT
There was an explosion on
the semi-submersible Deepwater Horizon on 20th April 2010, which was
completing a well for BP, 50 miles from the edge of the Mississippi delta in
the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven of the guys on board the rig unfortunately lost
their lives. Nine of them were employed by Transocean, the owners of the
rig, and two of them by MI-Swaco, a service company. The rest of the crew
successfully evacuated by lifeboat and were subsequently recovered to the
Tidewater platform ship, Damon B Bankston, and finally landed in Port
Fouchon twenty-seven hours after the incident. The rig continued to burn and
gradually took on an increasing list, and slipped under the waves on 22nd
April.
Today, 17th May, BP have
announced that they have stemmed the leak, apparently by means of inserting
a flexible tube into the end of the riser and channelling the oil flow to
the drill ship Discoverer Enterprise on the surface. The Discoverer
Enterprise has on board the plant required to separate the gas from
the oil, and is flaring off the gas, and is storing the oil in its tanks.
Apart from anything else, this process will provide everyone with a good
indication as to what the actual flow of oil from the well might be, since
the storage capacity of the drill ship is known. The possible flow has been
estimated as being as little as 1000 barrels per day and as much as 80,000
barrels per day. The upper figure seems to be pretty unlikely however.
Today's
announcement should bring some relief to the people on the gulf coast, to
the US administration and also to BP. There seems to have been general
amazement that the well could not just be turned off, but as everyone in the
business knows, that not the way it works.
Over
the last few days those of us who are still following
this story have seen some witness statements appearing
in the press, which, give us the opportunity of finding
out just a bit more about what happened, or at least
what was going on at the time. Apparently the
supply ship
Damon B Bankston was attached to the rig by a hose when
the blowout occurred and was engaged in the task of
backloading mud. Already I realise that I am lapsing
into industry speak, so we'll back track a bit.
The
Tidewater platform ship Damon B Bankston, photographed
by Oddgeir Refvik
It
seems that the well that the Deepwater Horizon had been
drilling was all over bar the shouting. They would have
successfully drilled into the reservoir, maintaining the
integrity of the well bore and the rig, by ensuring that
the oil and gas down there was kept in the proper place
by the column of mud and the pressure of the pumping
system. Mud or as it is more correctly known "drilling
fluid" is
made up of some form of oil ( they used to use diesel
oil once) or water, together with chemicals, mainly baryte, which is pumped down the hole using very large
pumps. The ones on the Deepwater Horizon were capable of
pumping at a pressure of 7500 psi. This fluid is stored
in tanks on the rig, and as well as providing a
hydrostatic head brings back to the surface the debris
produced by the drilling operation. While the well is
being drilled the returns are analysed by mud engineers
to determine what the formation is like, and whether
there is any gas or oil about. Back on the rig the mud
is cleaned and then pumped back down the well, and the
weight of the mud plus the pressure created by the pumps
keeps everybody safe.
So
having been through the process of drilling the well,
including casing it, which means inserting steel pipe
for the whole depth, something will be done with it. If
there is no oil down there, or not enough to warrant
further work the well will be plugged with cement and
the wellhead removed by one means or another. In the old
days they always used explosives but it is possible that
more scientific techniques are used today. Even if it is
intended that the well will be re-entered, as was to be
done in this case, it will be plugged with cement and
left with just the wellhead sticking out of the seabed.
So that's where they were apparently on the afternoon of
20th April. The well had been plugged with cement, and
the Tidewater platform ship Damon B Bankston was
attached to take the mud back to base for re-processing.
There would probably have been mud in the tanks, or pits
as they are known, and also mud in the well and the
riser. Eventually it would all be displaced with
seawater, because if the well was plugged with cement,
and all the work was finished, there were be no need for
the hydrostatic head.
At
some point during the discharge of the mud from the rig
to the ship the blowout took place, and a report by a
journalist who had interviewed one of the crew said that
a plume of mud and gas could be seen spurting into the
air like a geyser. Apparently the ship was then
instructed to let go the hose and stand off 500 metres.
Within a couple of minutes there was an explosion and
fire and all the lights went out.
What
then of the blowout preventer, the BOP, you might ask.
Well who knows. The first thing to say is that as far as
the guys on the rig were concerned, even though it was
still there on the seabed, they would probably not be
considering it necessary for the maintenance of safety,
because the cement plug was doing that. So there would
be no-one's finger hovering over the buttons. And much
has been said about BOP testing and BOP failures, and
even about the numerous failure modes that there might
be in this sort of equipment. Is the poor old drilling
industry to be hoist for testing the gear? Those
familiar with reliability science would tell you that
the availability of equipment is determined by testing,
and also that the time for which the equipment is
required to be reliable is taken into account. For
instance, in calculating the reliability of the
equipment used for space flights, they know it only has
to last for the duration of the flight. Similarly BOPs
only have to last - to remain reliable - for the
duration of the well, but if one is to make use of this
knowledge you have to test the BOP and correct any
failures before attaching it to the end of the riser and
lowering it to the seabed. And as I have said before,
deep water BOPs are extremely complex beasts. So who
knows about the BOP. We have not heard what the actual
status of the rams was after accident. Were they all
still unfired, unactioned, or were they all closed about
the drill pipe, with finally the shear rams almost
meeting but held apart by some bits of metal in the
wrong place, allowing the pressure in the reservoir to
force the oil out. And what were those ROVs actually
trying to do with the BOP? We little people on the
outside have no idea.
So,
regardless of what was happening down on the seabed, gas
and oil made it to the drill floor, and of course a
small volume of gas 23,000 feet down will expand quite a
bit on its way up. Once more we don't know what actually
happened but a sufficient volume of gas could envelope
the rig seeking out any possible ignition sources. We
should remember that this rig was dynamically
positioned, meaning that its computers were using
satellites, and probably beacons on the seabed, to
identify the required position and that this information
would be being transferred to the thrusters which would
be turning and whirring to hold the rig over the well.
The thrusters were powered by 6 Wartsila engines
developing 58,000 bhp. Of course the engines can provide
ignition sources and worse, they can be fuelled by gas
so that even if you turn them off they don't stop. It is
possible to fit engines with valves in the air intakes,
which overcomes this problem, but in the case of the
Deepwater Horizon would they have wanted to stop the
engines since they are the means by which the rig is
kept in position, or possibly changing the position.
Whether those in control on the rig stopped the engines
or not, survivors reported that all the power went off
and that there was an explosion, possibly not in that
order. So now the rig was left, being held in position
by the riser, with the product from the well burning on
deck. It must have been truly terrifying.
And we
can speculate on why the rig sank - but on another day.
Vic
Gibson 17th May 2010.
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