FEATURES

DEEPWATER HORIZON

Deepwater Horizon - What Have we Done to Deserve This
Deepwater Horizon - After the BP Report
Deepwater Horizon - The Investigation
The Deepwater Horizon and the Late MMS.
The Deepwater Horizon - PR and Politics
The Deepwater Horizon - Forces at Work
The Deepwater Horizon - Where Are We Now?
ROVs, Risers and Mud
The Deepwater Horizon - Later
Something about the Deepwater Horizon Accident
Channelling the Oil Leak
Preventing Fires and Explosions on Offshore Installations

OTHER ACCIDENTS
The Costa Concordia Grounding
The Loss of the Normand Rough
The Bourbon Dolphin Accident
The Loss of the Stevns Power
Another Marine Disaster
Something About the P36
The Cormorant Alpha Accident
The Loss of the Ocean Express

OPERATIONS
The Life of the Oil Mariner
Offshore Technology and the Kursk
The Sovereign Explorer and the Black Marlin

SAFETY
Safety Case Development
The ALARP Demonstration
PFEER, DCR and Verification
PFEER and the Dacon Scoop
Human Error and Heavy Weather Damage
Lifeboats & Offshore Installations
More about PFEER
The Offshore Safety Regime - Fit for the Next Decade
The Safety Case and its Future
Jigsaw
Collision Risk Management
Shuttle Tanker Collisions
A Good Prospect of Recovery

TECHNICAL
The History of the UT 704
The Peterhead Connection
Goodbye Kiss
Uses for New Ships
Supporting Deepwater Drilling
Jack-up Moving - An Overview
Seismic Surveying
Breaking the Ice
Tank Cleaning and the Environment
More about Mud Tank Cleaning
Datatrac
Tank Cleaning in 2004
Glossary of Terms

CREATIVE WRITING
An Unusual Investigation
Gaia and Oil Pollution
The True Price of Oil
Icebergs and Anchor-Handlers
Atlantic SOS
The Greatest Influence
How It Used to Be
Homemade Pizza
Goodbye Far Turbot
The Ship Manager
Running Aground
A Cook's Tale
Navigating the Channel
The Captain's Letter

GENERAL INTEREST
The Sealaunch Project
Ghost Ships of Hartlepool
Beam Him Up Scotty
Q790
The Bilbao OSV Conference

THE DEEPWATER HORIZON - PR AND POLITICS

There is now so much information on the internet about the loss of the Deepwater Horizon that it is difficult to keep up. Now on 22nd June, two calendar months since the rig sank, taking to the seabed with it one assumes, the bodies of the eleven men who died during the emergency, the investigation into the event, and the battle on the beaches of Louisiana and Florida against the oil spill, have almost been forgotten as American senators vie with each other in a competition to see who can be nastiest to BP, and who can make the best use of the tragedy. The old maxim of never letting a good disaster go to waste seems to be uppermost in their minds.  And it does not seem as if the senior management of BP have done much to help themselves, despite their apparent success in reducing the outflow of oil.

So what was going on out there in the oilfield? The Discoverer Enterprise was still recovering between fifteen and twenty thousand barrels a day of crude oil using the modified LMRP and the Q4000 was recovering several thousand barrels a day using the kill line from the BOP connected to the manifold which had been installed to carry out the top kill, and by the way, if you are new to this narrative, most of the terms are explained in the previous articles or in the Glossary of Terms. The Discoverer Enterprise is storing the results in its tanks and then offloading them to a tug and barge system, while the Q4000 is burning off the results.

During last week this status was confirmed at a pres conference conducted by Admiral Thad Allen of the Coastguard. He also confirmed that the Development Driller III is progressing well with the drilling of the relief well, and behind it Development Driller II is also drilling a relief well. Both of these rigs are owned by Transocean, a point made by Mr Weaver of Transocean when he appeared before the Senate transportation Sub-Committee on 17th June, of which more later. Admiral Allen also updated us on the status of the systems which are to replace the current processes in the future, but in this regard we do not see much difference at the moment.

So while operations have virtually become a steady process, the politics have been nothing like this. The week ended with BP's Tony Hayward going yachting on Saturday. He joined his son, apparently, in the annual Isle of Wight, Round the Island race on his yacht, or his son's yacht "Bob". It is possible that he was hoping to remain anonymous judging by the pictures of him in the media, but this was unsuccessful, which resulted in an outcry in America. What was he doing out there enjoying himself they asked. That boat should be helping with the oil spill, not engaging in pointless leisure activities, they said. Oh dear, why didn't he just stay at home and watch a bit of TV! This obvious PR error committed by Mr Hayward was preceded by one committed by the BP Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg. On leaving the meeting with President Obama, at which BP agreed to fund the costs of the clean up up to a value of $20 billion he said "We care about the small people".

On the following day these words came back to haunt Tony Hayward who appeared before a senate committee for seven hours. There seemed to be lines of senators and there he was all by himself. He had apparently been tutored for the event by the PR firm Brunswick, but this did not seem to have helped much. I wondered how the senators have become so well informed as they asked pertinent questions about cement jobs, and single strings and casing hangers, and it appears that Tony Hayward did as well, since he seemed unable or unwilling to answer nearly all of their questions. As it turned out they had probably used the presentation on the investigation carried out by Halliburton, which made something of a different case from that made by the presentation from Transocean or the presentation from BP. The senators said that he was going to be sliced and diced, and sure enough he was, although what good all this did is questionable. His only relief was an apology quite close to the beginning of the hearing from Joe Barton who said that the  $20 billion contribution had been nothing more than a shakedown. However the senator retracted the apology later in the day. The hearing concluded with the senator Bart Stupak telling the BP Chief Executive "We are not small people but we wish to get our lives back", linking the gaff made by the chairman with one made earlier by the chief executive.

During the week the documents which had been submitted to the US Government by Halliburton, Transocean and BP also made it into the public domain, and sure enough there was the Halliburton information highlighting the differences and the number of barriers created by the different types of well casing. The one chosen by BP only created two barriers they said, while the one which they would have recommended created four barriers - they said. So there was the senate committee's information. The Transocean presentation was less helpful, really only indicating possible areas for further investigation, and showing the various times when the BOP was tested; something which has been called into question even on UK TV when it was claimed that one of the control pods was leaking. The BP presentation includes a great deal of data on the well, since in this modern era the information is transmitted to the shore in real time, and indicates where unexpected pressures in the well had been seen, and how the operation progressed. At least one expert has related the displacement of the mud with seawater to the accident, and the BP document suggests that at the very least this activity may have masked the fact that the well was flowing.  The data ceased to be received at 2131 on the day of the accident, and the first explosion was observed to have taken place at 2149. In between it is possible that the diverter was activated, that is, after the BOP shear rams were operated, and which failed to isolate the well. Obviously what happened during these eighteen minutes are critical to the investigation, and doubtless we will know more in time.

On Thursday 17th June the senate transportation subcommittee met to interview some people with a relevance to the Deepwater Horizon accident. They started off the Rear-Admiral Kevin Cook of the US Coastguard, who seemed to be constantly at a loss as he tried to explain to the senators the responsibilities of flag states, and ABS and the inspection regimes carried out on foreign flag vessels - flag state inspections. He made occasional references to the IMO (The International Maritime Organisation) and how the coastguard attempts to guide international legislation in ways which will best serve the United States and maritime safety in general. This did not seem to cut much ice with the members of the committee who ask whether anyone from the Marshall Islands (the flag of the Deepwater Horizon) ever visited any ships in US waters or had provided any assistance in the disaster, or whether the South Koreans had been involved in any way (The constructors of the Deepwater Horizon) or whether the Swiss had done anything at all (the country in which Transocean now resides). Of course most of this was actually grandstanding ( in my view) with the objective of making a point about the Jones Act, and how all vessels operating in US waters should be American built, American crewed and American flagged. This is of course the most extreme form of cabotage, and once more one wonders how it is contributing to the investigation, the saving of lives in the future and the saving of the Gulf coast, its wildlife and its beaches in the present.

Vic Gibson 22nd June 2010.

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