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RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE SEWOL TRAGEDY
Time has
passed since the sinking of the Sewol with the loss of about 300 lives. As
far as we are aware the Captain and most, if not all, of the deck department
have been arrested and are probably in custody. Meanwhile journalists around
the world have been beavering away and it has been revealed that the ship
had been modified by the addition of accommodation on the upper deck aft. As
a result of this modification the maximum cargo the ship was allowed to
carry was about 900 tonnes instead of something approaching 4000 tonnes
which was actually on board. It looks likely that the 3000 tonne difference
was actually supposed to be ballast, so if this ballast was not in place no
wonder the thing fell over.
In addition numbers of members of the management of the shipping company
have also been arrested, and the South Korean authorities have recently
offered a $500,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of Yoo
Byung-eun, the patriarch of the shipping company Chonghaejin Marine, owners
of the Sewol. They have also offered $100,000 for information leading to the
arrest of Yoo Dae-gyun, Yoo Byung-eun’s eldest son. The fact that these
gentlemen have gone on the run seems to indicate that they at least believe
they know who is responsible for the disaster.
The South Korean Prime Minister also resigned over the disaster, and their
coastguard has been disbanded. There has also apparently been a tendency for
retired government officials to join the board of commercial organisations,
the activities of which they had previously had an oversight, and this
cronyism is to be specifically addressed by the new PM. How does the
unfortunate master stand in all this? We don’t know what he knew, or even
what sort of training he had received for dealing with this sort of major
emergency. It is at least fair to assume that the company had not considered
such a disaster, or the manner in which passengers would be kept safe. That
would be called a risk assessment. (Since I wrote this item there has been
much made in the maritime press of protests by a number of august bodies to
IMO about the criminalizing of the Captain and crew of the Sewol. Time will
tell whether these protests have any effect)
DON'T HEAD STRAIGHT FOR THE PLATFORM
As I seem to keep saying these days, I have
spent many years now writing safety stuff, and you can find some of it on
the Ships and Oil website. I have written and spoken formally and informally
on safety matters, and one point I have always made to those operating
offshore support vessels is ‘DON’T HEAD STRAIGHT FOR THE PLATFORM!’ Then if
something goes wrong, or you forget what you are supposed to be doing (yes
it happens) the ship will just steam on, and the worst thing that will
happen to you is getting a bit red in the face. But the Nautilus Telegraph
has reported that an unnamed ERRV was heading for a platform the other day
to go on close standby, when a change of watch took taking place – the Mate
to the Captain. As the ship was approaching the platform the Captain
attempted to change direction by steering with the aziprops but nothing
happened. He increased speed to improve control (Is this beginning to sound
familiar?) but nothing happened. So in a close quarters situation he stopped
one of the aziprops and the ship turned, missing the platform by three
metres. The Mate had not told the Captain that he had the ship in autopilot.
This failure to notice that the autopilot is engaged has resulted in several
collisions, but if they had just steered a few degrees off from the direct
course towards the platform it would not have mattered.
THE
LOSS OF THE OCEAN RANGER
The Seaforth
Highlander, which was acting as the standby vessel at the Ocean Ranger in
1982. Photo from ‘Shipspotting’.
I find
that, despite the fact that, on many occasions, I have used the Ocean Ranger
accident as an example of how a minor incident can turn into a catastrophe,
during my 20 odd years and a safety consultant, I have not included a
description of it on the website. To rectify this omission this is an
extract from my book ‘Supply Ship Operations.’ A fuller description can be
found on the Ships and Oil website.
The Ocean Ranger was an extremely large and relatively well-found
semi-submersible which, in the spring of 1982, was drilling for Mobil on the
Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland. It had eight columns. Key to the
events which followed, the Ballast Control Room was situated in the
aftermost intermediate column on the starboard side, below the level of the
main deck.
No ships at all were involved in the disaster prior to its occurrence, but
it was a marine event, caused by a combination of poor design, bad practice
and lack of knowledge. One of the many failings detailed by the enquiry was
the curious diversity of responsibility for the rig. During the enquiry a
number of former masters of the Ocean Ranger were interviewed and they
testified that they had responsibility for marine matters without the
authority to properly discharge their duties. The masters had no crew
directly under their control and even the ballast control operators took
their orders from the tool-pusher, the senior drilling person on the unit.
The report on the sinking stated that “He had no knowledge of the ballasting
system or the principles of stability. And yet the ultimate authority and
responsibility for the safety of the rig and its crew rested in his hands”.
The initiating event in the disaster was the weather, which turned from
unpleasant to apocalyptic over the days up to 15th February 1982. On the
previous evening the wind speed was about 70 knots and the rig was heaving
alarmingly. Other rigs in the area, the Sedco 706 and the Zapata Ugland were
both hit by large waves.
On the Ocean Ranger a large wave broke the port glass and flooded the
Ballast Control Room, dousing the ballast control board. For those
unfamiliar with the function of this equipment, the board is used to
electronically control the valves and pumps which operate the ballast system
on semi-submersibles.
The problem for the Ocean Ranger, was that when the control board was doused
in water, valves in the pontoons started to open and close randomly, to the
distress of the control room operators. They knew that they had a problem
they did not know how to solve it. Like many ballast control systems, the
one on the Ocean Ranger was provided with solenoids which changed the
electrical power into hydraulic power. A switch on the board would activate
the solenoid which would open or close to allow hydraulic pressure to be
exerted on the valve actuator, or to be removed, usually allowing the valve
to close. Realising that they had to do something, someone inserted a set of
brass rods into the solenoids, apparently thinking that the valves would be
closed, but instead the valves were opened. This allowed water to flow
freely between the tanks, and since the ballast tanks in the Ocean Ranger
were distributed along the lengths of the pontoons all the water ran from
aft to forward. The rig gradually trimmed by the head until the chain
lockers filled up, and then in the dark at three in the morning on 16th
February the rig disappeared from the radar screens of the ships in the
area.
There were two OSA ships, the Boltentor and the Nordertor standing by the
Sedco 706 and the Zapata Ugland, and the Seaforth Highlander was standing by
the Ocean Ranger. At five past one on the day of the disaster, only two
hours before the sinking, the Mobil foreman requested that the Seaforth
Highlander come to close standby, and a few minutes later the other rigs
dispatched their standby vessels towards the distress. In 60-foot waves one
should remember that any movement of a ship in a specific direction, rather
than just maintaining a heading to reduce the possibility of structural
damage, is something of a feat.
The report states that during the approach to the rig the Seaforth
Highlander made ready the equipment it had available which might assist in
the rescue. This, pathetically, consisted of a cargo net, a grappling hook,
a boat hook, two heaving lines and two lifebuoys fitted with lines. The
Master of the Seaforth Highlander saw a flare at about 2.14 as the ship was
approaching the rig, and that this flare had been fired from a lifeboat.
The ship approached the lifeboat and the Master decided to place the ship
stern to wind with the lifeboat astern of the ship. In this way he would be
able to maintain the heading, and would not be at risk of running the
lifeboat down. The witnesses said that the lifeboat was also head to wind
apparently under power. The Seaforth Highlander now stern to the seas was
manoeuvred closer to the craft and the seas breaking over the after deck
were freezing instantly and making it difficult for the crew to do anything
useful in their less than adequate protective clothing.
Just after 2.30 the Seaforth Highlander reported that the lifeboat was
alongside. The crew on the deck managed to throw lines which the survivors
in the lifeboat managed to attach, and at this time a number of men emerged
onto the port side. It seems reasonable to assume that others had undone
their safety belts, and had stood up, and obviously the bailing activities
which had been going on now ceased. These changes probably contributed to a
loss of stability and as a result the lifeboat rolled slowly over, throwing
a number of men into the sea. The deck crew made valiant attempts to recover
them, with some considerable risk to themselves since the seas were still
breaking over the deck.
Meanwhile the other ships arrived. The Boltentor was asked to assist in the
recovery of the lifeboat, and the Nordertor was sent to monitor the rig
itself, the Nordertor reporting the loss of the radar echo of the rig at
three o’clock. Then all three vessels took up the task of searching for
survivors or bodies in the sea, but the report of the enquiry notes that
“sea conditions and inadequate retrieval equipment frustrated all efforts to
recover bodies”.
During the final but unsuccessful attempts to recover the lifeboat, the
Captain of the Nordertor observed that there were about twenty bodies
inside. Several floated out through a hole in the bow, and one was washed
onto the deck of the ship. Over the following days the search continued for
bodies, the fleet now enhanced by a number of other vessels, and by 20th
February a total of 22 bodies had been recovered. Not one person, of the 83
man crew, was saved..
SHIP OF
GOLD
The BBC
website reports that a deep sea exploration company has recovered 1000 oz of
gold from the wreck of the Central America.
The ship sank back in 1857 with the loss of 425 lives and also 21 tonnes of
gold, when it was caught in a hurricane 160 miles off the South Carolina
coast. The gold was intended to prop up the banking system in New York, and
its loss resulted in financial panic.
Since the recent recovery all activity has stopped amidst a blizzard of
writs and counter claims, reflecting the earlier legal activity after a
previous treasure hunting venture.
This was led by a man called Thomas G Thompson who developed the means of
recovering the valuables from the wreck during the 1980s and with financial
backing from a number of investors, ventured out there and started to do the
job.
In 1987 his company recovered a quantity of gold and other valuables, but in
1990 the insurers of the cargo filed suit to claim the rights to the cargo,
but lost. They appealed and in 1992 the court ruled in their favour. A
further trial in 1993 produced yet another result, and in the end Thompson’s
company and the insurers agreed to split the rewards.
Thompson sold some or all of the gold in 2000, but his investors received
nothing, because, appar-ently all the proceeds had been used to pay for the
court cases. They have sued him And when he failed to turn up for a hearing
an arrest warrant was issued. His current where-abouts are unknown. The gold
remaining in the wreck may be worth as much as $97 million. More on this
story later!
THE MIGUEL DE SERVANTES
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Back in
1993 the Liberian registered tanker the Braer ran aground at the
southernmost point of the Shetland Islands and broke up. No lives were lost,
and there was limited damage to the environment due to the fact that the
ship was carrying Norwegian light crude oil. However an enquiry headed by
Lord Donaldson determined that the British government should station
emergency towing vessels (ETVs) around the coast of the UK in order the
limit the possibility of further events of this sort.
For a while a number of vessels were stationed around the Uk coast, and the
tug operator JPKnight made a business of it, operating a number of UT 719s.
Although these ships did some work, they never intervened in a disaster
similar to the Braer, and this has led the UK government to discard the
process. This is a gamble!! And it may or may not come off.
The photo is of one of the many well found vessels operated by the Spanish
emergency services, which include two UT 722s. Other governments operate
ETVs, including the French, the Germans and the Dutch. I am not alone in
thinking that the UK government should take responsibility for the
safeguarding of the coastline and those at sea around it.
INFORMATION ABOUT THIS NEWSLETTER AND SHIPS AND OIL LTD
This newsletter expresses the views of the author Victor Gibson about marine
events which are considered to be worthy of interest. It is meant to be a
five minute read. Sources of information include:
International Tug and OSV Magazine
The Tugs, Towing and Offshore Newsletter.
The Nautilus Telegraph
The Nautical institute Magazine, Seaways
The BBC Home Page
The MAIB Website
gCaptain
World Maritime News
The Siberia Times
The Scotsman
The Ships and Oil website contains comprehensive information about many
offshore vessels and approaching 10,000 images.
People have continued to send pictures of the day for which I am very
grateful. The photos brighten the days of our hundreds of visitors as they
sit at their desks – I have noticed that our numbers are considerably
reduced at the weekends. By the way I have been told that a number of
subscribers to the newsletter send it on to others – if you are one of the
others email me for your own copy! I have had one or two requests, but have
not always been successful in sending the newsletter. Maybe their systems
reject PDFs.
There have been some company updates this month, these are:
EDT Offshore
Eidesvik
ER Schiffahrt
Fairmount Towage
Farstad
Finarge Genova
Five Ocean Salvage
Flomex Shipping
Fugro
Geoships
Eide Offshore
EMAS Offshore
Esvagt
Fairplay Towage
Femco Management
Finarge Brasil
Fletcher Shipping
Fratelli D'Amato
Gardline
Global Offshore
Recent Pictures of the Day include:
Far Senior
Highland Princess
Siem Moxie
Reed Despina
Siem Sapphire
Chinese Supply Boat
SHIPS AND OIL OFFERS THE FOLLOWING PUBLICATION FOR SALE ON ITS WEBSITE:
THE HISTORY OF THE SUPPLY SHIP £37.50 inc P&P anywhere
SUPPLY SHIP OPERATIONS £27.50 inc P&P anywhere
RIGMOVES £5.75 inc P&P anywhere.
Buy all three books for the bargain price of £52.5
If you would prefer not to receive further news letters please email me vic@shipsandoil.com
.
Vic Gibson. May 2014.
To view earlier News and
Views Click Here.
If you would like to
receive News and Views as a PDF - with photos -
email me.
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