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SUMMARIES OF MAJOR  ACCIDENT REPORTS
(In event order)

THE KULLUK INCIDENT
December 2012
THE COSTA CONCORDIA
January 2012
THE TRINITY II
September 2011
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
April 2010
THE BOURBON DOLPHIN
April 2007
THE STEVNS POWER
October 2003
THE OCEAN RANGER
February 1982
THE OCEAN EXPRESS
April 1976

PICTURE OF THE DAY
PIC OF THE DAY ARCHIVES
2007 - 77 Photographs
2008 - 101 Photographs
2009 - 124 Photographs
2010 - 118 Photographs
2011 - 100 Photographs
2012 - 97 Photographs

 

 

         

Go to 'Publications' to buy any of these books.

THE HISTORY OF THE SUPPLY SHIP
£37.50.

SUPPLY SHIP OPERATIONS
£27.50

RIGMOVES £5.75

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DON'T FORGET YOU CAN PURCHASE "THE HISTORY OF THE SUPPLY SHIP", "SUPPLY SHIP OPERATIONS" and "RIGMOVES" HERE FOR £52.50 TOGETHER

THE ALARP DEMONSTRATION IN THE OFFSHORE ENVIRONMENT

The HSE say the following in their 2009 “Demonstration of ALARP” document which is actually written for the nuclear industry:

The requirement for risks to be ALARP is fundamental and applies to all activities within the scope of the Health and Safety at Work Act. It is important that inspectors, in whatever role, are aware of the need to ensure that licensees meet this requirement. In simple terms it is a requirement to take all measures to reduce risk which are not unreasonably costly. In many cases this is not done explicitly, but rather by the establishment and/or use of relevant good practices and standards. The development of good practices and standards includes ALARP considerations so in many cases meeting them is sufficient. In other cases, either where standards and relevant good practices are less evident or not fully applicable, the onus is on the licensee to implement measures to the point where the costs of any further measures would be grossly disproportionate to the risks they would reduce.

To elaborate on this statement, the UK regulators are really saying that if you are following established rules, guidance and best practice you can consider your risk in carrying out whatever task is being reviewed as ALARP, but first of all you have to decide what hazards are to be assessed.

I know about mobile drilling units, so to use them as an example, the industry has over the last 20 years pretty well determined what semi-submersibles, jack-ups and drill ships do and hence to what hazards they are exposed. So it is good enough to get hold of the existing list of hazards and to assess the risks relating to them (in safety speak the realization of the hazards)using what-ever means seem to be suitable. The drilling industry as a whole is very averse to QRA (Quantitative Risk Analysis) which is the determination of the seriousness of the risk by accessing existing records, and doing some calculations, but it can be helpful particularly to determine whether risks are ALARP. Hence if an event is only likely to occur once in a million years according to your QRA, you don’t have to make a big effort to reduce the risks further. But if the event is likely to occur every 100 years the requirements will be completely different, and you will have much to do.

One of the failings of QRA is that it does not usually result in recommendations, it just tells you how things are, and another is that it can easily be manipulated to produce the required results. Safety records vary depending on which part of the world one is considering so levels of risk are easily over or under stated. So in order to ensure that risk are ALARP some sort of qualitative work is required. There are a number of techniques, but one of the most effective is probably the bowtie method. This is not an article intended to promote any particular software, but BowtieXP works very well.

Hence in order to ensure that risks are ALARP regular risk assessments should be undertaken and the recommendations resulting from them carried out. What if there are no recommendations I hear you ask, and what is meant by regular? The answer it that there should always be recommendations resulting from an assessment of major hazards, and that “regular” may be only as often as every five years.

The UK health and safety ethos is that there is always room for improvement, but that eventually the cost of making the improvements will be pointless, since the reduction in risk will be minimal. To use an example, when considering the risk of capsize of a semi-submersible due to loss of stability (which has happened less often than one might think) it may not be worthwhile making major structural changes to a rig, but it will always be worth training the ballast control operators how to do the job. This is considering what is known as “gross disproportion”.

So in order to ensure that one’s risks are ALARP, one has to carry out risk assessments regularly and then carry out the resulting recommendations as long as they will actually result in a reduction in risk. It is an iterative process.

Victor Gibson. September 2012
 

 TO RETURN TO FEATURES INDEX CLICK HERE

 
 
FEATURES

THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
Deepwater Horizon -The President's Report
Deepwater Horizon - The Progess of the Event

OTHER ACCIDENTS
The KULLUK Grounding
The Costa Concordia Report
The Costa Concordia Grounding
The Elgin Gas Leak
The Loss of the Normand Rough
The Bourbon Dolphin Accident
The Loss of the Stevns Power
Another Marine Disaster
Something About the P36
The Cormorant Alpha Accident
The Ocean Ranger Disaster
The Loss of the Ocean Express

OPERATIONS
The Life of the Oil Mariner
Offshore Technology and the Kursk
The Sovereign Explorer and the Black Marlin

SAFETY
Safety Case and SEMS
Practical Safety Case Development
Preventing Fires and Explosions Offshore
The ALARP Demonstration
PFEER, DCR and Verification
PFEER and the Dacon Scoop
Human Error and Heavy Weather Damage
Lifeboats & Offshore Installations
More about PFEER
The Offshore Safety Regime - Fit for the Next Decade
The Safety Case and its Future
Jigsaw
Collision Risk Management
Shuttle Tanker Collisions
A Good Prospect of Recovery

TECHNICAL
The History of the UT 704
The Peterhead Connection
Goodbye Kiss
Uses for New Ships
Supporting Deepwater Drilling
Jack-up Moving - An Overview
Seismic Surveying
Breaking the Ice
Tank Cleaning and the Environment
More about Mud Tank Cleaning
Datatrac
Tank Cleaning in 2004
Glossary of Terms

CREATIVE WRITING
An Unusual Investigation
Gaia and Oil Pollution
The True Price of Oil
Icebergs and Anchor-Handlers
Atlantic SOS
The Greatest Influence
How It Used to Be
Homemade Pizza
Goodbye Far Turbot
The Ship Manager
Running Aground
A Cook's Tale
Navigating the Channel
The Captain's Letter

GENERAL INTEREST
The Sealaunch Project
Ghost Ships of Hartlepool
Beam Him Up Scotty
Q790
The Bilbao OSV Conference