THE KULLUK GROUNDING.
On 31st December 2012 the
mobile drilling unit KULLUK grounded on a beach on
Sitkalidak Island, Alaska, with no injuries or loss of life.
The event was investigated by the US Coast Guard and their
report published in April 2014. The accident is of
particular interest to those who develop emergency plans for
the offshore industry since it may be the first loss of tow
accident which has reached its conclusion, despite attempts
The following is a summary of the report highlighting what,
in the opinion of the reviewer, are the most important
aspects of the accident.
the unfortunate main player in this accident, was selected
to tow the KULLUK from Alaska to Seattle. Picture ECO
THE VESSELS INVOLVED.
The KULLUK is a unique conical mobile drilling unit built
for Beaufort in 1979 by Mitsui and laid up for many years
prior to purchase by Shell for Alaskan drilling operations.
It is operated on behalf of the oil company by Noble
The AIVIQ is a heavy duty AHTS built at the Edison Chouest
yard of North American Ship building and operated by that
company. It is about 100 metres long, had 21000 bhp
available and can exert a bollard pull of a little over 200
The GUARDSMAN is a traditional GOM tug, built in 1976 by
McDermott, about 40 metres long. With 7200 bhp available and
able to provide a bollard pull of about 75 tonnes. It is
operated by Crowley Marine Services.
The ALERT is a modern 40 metre tug with twin Z drives
providing 150 tonnes bollard pull from 10,000 bhp
(Optimistic I think). It was built by Dakota Creek
Industries and is operated by the Crowley management
NANUQ is a traditional AHTS built in 2007 by North American
Fabricators. It is about 80 metres long with 7000 bhp
providing 90 tonnes bollard pull. It is owned by Nautical
Ventures which appears to be an ECO company.
The ALEX HALEY is what the Coastguard call an ‘Medium
Endurance Cutter’ built in 1967 by Brooke Marine in
Lowestoft. It has, surprisingly, a crew of 104, and its
towing capabilities are limited to a ‘Towing Bit”.
THE TOWING PLAN.
It appears that Shell decided to move the rig to Seattle
because there was considerable work required to bring the
unit up to spec for the 2013 campaign. Additionally,
although denied to start with by Shell management in Alaska,
it was likely, had the rig been in Alaskan waters at the end
of the year, that Shell would have been charged several
million dollars in tax on the capital value of the unit.
It seems that a towing plan was developed for the operation,
but not against any standards or procedures, and
subsequently this plan was passed for review to the
following Shell personnel: Alaska Operations Manager, Alaska
Drilling Manager, Logistics Team Lead, Health Safety and
Environmental Team Lead and Emergency Response Specialist
and additionally the ORMI Tow Master, and the Noble
personnel, the Rig Manager, the Operations Manager - Alaska
and the GL Noble Denton warranty surveyor. Final approvers
included the Alaska Venture Operations Manager, Alaska Well
Delivery Manager, Alaska Logistics Team Lead, Alaska HSE
Team Lead and the Alaska Marine Manager. All approvers were
included as plan reviewers.
The Alaska Venture Operations Manager was considered the
final approval authority but he was on holiday at the time,
and so final approval lay with a deputy who had never
reviewed a tow plan within Shell, had not participated in
any of the planning meetings, and had not received any
related training or even guidance about the process.
The final tow plan approval was received on December 21,
2012 which was the actual day of departure.
An aspect of the plan was that the route would proceed in a
broadly Easterly direction maintaining a distance within 200
miles of the coast, so as to remain within helicopter range.
This was as an alternative to a great circle route, which
would have been shorter, and at a greater distance from the
coast. The report details the possible weather for three
possible routes and determined that it was likely to be
pretty awful no matter which route was chosen.
The plan apparently took into consideration the previous
towing records, which involved the AIVIQ, once from Seattle
to Dutch Harbour, as sole towing vessel, but in June, and
also considered the expected adverse weather in the Gulf of
Alaska in winter. Although by now the reliability of the
AIVIQ was, to say the least, questionable, it is not known
whether any of the plan reviewers were aware of this.
The plan detailed possible emergency equipment, including
the provision of an ‘standard insurance wire’ emergency
retrieval system, five stevpris type anchors carried on the
deck of the rig, and the provision of a tow chain retrieval
hook, ‘referred to as an Orville Hook’ on the tow vessel (I
had to look in the American Navy Towing Manual to find out
what an Orville Hook was. It seems to be a J-hook hanging
from a balloon).
The December towing plan apparently relied on a previous
plan discussed in the summer which had involved people from
Shell, Noble Drilling, Edison Chouest, Delmar Systems,
Offshore Rig Movers International and MatthewsDaniel. And
the report says that there was no evidence of any
reassessment of the towing configuration, This, even though
the KULLUK required 200 tons of bollard pull to hold it
stationary in specific adverse conditions – which were
likely to be met during this operation.
PREPARATION FOR THE TOW.
Because of subsequent events much space in the report is
devoted to the change in the KULLUK towing configuration
prior to its departure from Seattle in July 2012. This
involved the substitution of the three 85t SWL shackles used
in the monkey’s face (towing plate) connections with 120 t
SWL shackles,. The concern to the investigator was the lack
of information on the source and certification of these
shackles, although it was not suggested that they were
unsuitable. It seems that they just happened to be in store
in the shipyard.
There were also changes to the length of the 76mm pennant
used as what we have come to know in Europe as the ‘weak
link’ although it is not identified as such in the report.
This was lengthened from 40 ft to 100 ft to reduce the
difficulties of connection. The ‘emergency tow wire’ was
also not quite as specified, now including a 400 ft length
of ‘Samson Saturn’ rope and the substitution of three 120 t
SWL shackles for 85 t shackles – but one 85t shackles
remained in this system. It was also provided with as
significantly shorter chain. If nothing else the failure to
reflect these changes in the actual plan shows a lack of
attention to detail.
The report goes on to consider the readiness of the AIVIQ
for the tow, and was able to identify many minor and fairly
major failings in the ship’s equipment. These were stated in
the report to be ‘a host of mechanical problems’. However
the most serious item highlighted by the Master was that the
ship was consistently taking water on the main deck, the
main deck safe areas and in the winch space in adverse
weather, in one case resulting in the vessel taking on a
On 19th December the GL Noble Denton warranty surveyor
inspected the AIVIQ and noted no deficiencies in the vessel.
He also inspected the KULLUK and its towing arrangements,
failing to notice that the 85t shackles for which the rig
held certificates had been replaced by 120t shackles. The
surveyor was present as the towing system was made up on the
quayside, and related photographs are contained in the
report. But the make-up did not result in any changes to the
shackle connecting the towing plate to the weak link which
had been in the same position since being fitted in Seattle.
THE TIMELINE OF THE ACCIDENT.
1430. KULLUK under tow of AIVIQ departs Captains Bay bound
1600. Tow reaches open water and tow line extended to 1700
The KULLUK Tow Master and the AIVIQ Master discuss the
possibility of changing to a great circle, but the KULLUK is
keen to keep within the range of SAR helicopters, and so the
prepared route is maintained.
AIVIQ No 2 main diesel engine develops an oil leak requiring
monitoring and on occasion the shut down of the unit. The
Master appraises Edison Chouest, the Tow Master and Shell of
On this day further discussion about routing takes place and
the possibility of taking a more southerly route to avoid an
approaching low pressure system is considered.
AM. Wind SE 20-25 knots. AIVIQ’s winch control starts
generating high tension alarms. More wire is paid out and
apparently the vessel slowed, although later investigation
was unable to determine that this took place. A video taken
by one of the watch keepers at about 0900 shows the tension
in the tow wire cycling between 35 tons and 228 tons.
Analysis carried out by Rolls Royce after the event
determined that the overload alarm described as ‘wire
tensile strength overload on tow drum’ occurred on 38
separate occasions. It would seem that the alarm would have
been triggered had the load on the wire exceeded 300 tons.
The watch keeper had no recollection of receiving these
1135. Loss of tow. Apparently due to the failure of the 120
ton shackle connecting the tow line to the monkey’s face.
The KULLUK is adrift 52 miles from Sitkinak Island. The
KULLUK recovers the towing plate and the AIVIQ recovers its
tow wire. There is no sign of the shackle. The tug GUARDSMAN
and the NANUQ (An AHTS but designated as an oil spill
response vessel) notified to get under way. Coast Guard
vessel ALEX HALEY instructed to proceed to assist.
1200+. It is decided to reconnect the tow using the
emergency system, since the use of the KULLUK cranes in the
adverse weather deemed to be inadvisable. AIVIQ approaching
to pick up emergency tow line takes a roll and its J-Hook
breaks loose and requires restowing.
1445. AIVIQ successfully reconnects to the emergency tow
line. KULLUK towed away from an ‘8 fathom patch’ considered
a danger due to the KULLUK draft of ‘10.7 metres’.
2255. The AIVIQ’s No 2 diesel is shut down for oil level
checks and refuses to restart. And soon afterwards the
engineers note that the injectors are failing on all
0131. Wind SW 25-30 knots. ALEX HALEY arrives on scene.
0245. All the main engines have shut down, so the AIVIQ is
propelled by the 2600 bhp azimuthing thruster and directed
by the tunnel thrusters, provided with power by the ship
service generators. The ship is able to maintain station
ahead of the tow but all are being pulled astern.
Subsequent to the loss of the main engines it is agreed
between the Masters that the ALEX HALEY will try to take the
AIVIQ (and therefore also the KULLUK) in tow. This process
involves the firing of a line to the AIVIQ. The crew on the
bow of the anchor-handler then attempt to recover a thicker
messenger which is connected to the ALEX HALEY towing
hawser. The Coastguard vessel has problems maintaining
station and the crew mistakenly think that the process is
more advanced than it is. They deploy the towing hawser too
early, and this results in 800 ft of messenger line and part
of the towing hawser being picked up by the Coast Guard
ship’s port propeller.
0600. 5 injectors are replaced on No1 main diesel and it is
successfully restarted. However the ship and tow are still
being pulled astern.
1115. ALEX HALEY is instructed to depart for Kodiak for
1329. Tug GUARDSMAN arrives on the scene.
1538. The GUARDSMAN has the AIVIQ and therefore the KULLUK
in tow. But the whole set is still being pulled slowly
astern. The GUARDSMAN’s towing system is of course
commensurate with its available bollard pull.
Late evening. KULLUK lowers its 15 tonne LWT anchor to a
depth below the hull. The ships and the tow are now about 9
miles from the island. This emergency anchor is a 15 ton LWT
connected to 900 ft of chain. There is much in the report
about the timing and intent of the anchor deployment, but
the reality is that it seems to have done no good.
2300. Wind SE 35-45 knots. Helicopters arrive on scene to
attempt to evacuate the KULLUK, but due to the pitch and
heave of the unit and the proximity of the derrick the
attempt was abandoned.
At this time GUARDSMAN reports that they are still being set
towards Sitkinak Island.
0300-1000. Delivery of 74 new injectors in 12 lifts by Coast
Guard helicopters to AIVIQ takes place.
0425. Tug ALERT departs from Port Etches near Valdez for the
0510. GUARDSMAN tow wire parts. Subsequent to this the
emergency anchor deployed again and drags over the seabed
0630. NANUQ arrives on scene, and after daylight prepares to
take the KULLUK under tow, connecting to the rig by using a
line throwing apparatus.
1150. NANUQ has the rig under tow using No 8 anchor wire
connected to its 64 mm tow wire. AIVIQ is still towing the
rig, with its azimuthing thruster, on the emergency tow
1200. KULLUK emergency anchor recovered and the tow begins
to make progress away from the island.
1235. Evacuation of the 18 rig crew by Coast Guard
1335. Evacuation of the rig completed. Hence no further
changes to the towing configuration are possible with
intervention from the riding crew, and command on scene
transferred from the Tow Master to the Master of the AIVIQ.
All the AIVIQ main engines are now back on line.
Those in the ‘Unified Command Centre’ ashore might by now
have been breathing a sigh of relief, but the operation was
now threatened by worsening weather.
AM. Winds SSW 40-50 knots.
1315. NANUQ’s tow parts, and shortly thereafter the AIVIQ
tow parts at the spliced eye of the emergency tow line.
KULLUK adrift approximately 30 miles from land.
1325. Tug ALERT arrives at the scene, and initially is
unable to connect to anything due to the clutter in the sea
in the vicinity of the rig. To at least one reader of this
report it seems that at last a proper professional vessel
has arrived, and the subsequent intervention of the ALERT
seem to support this view.
1630. It is decided that the AIVIQ will grapple for the No 8
anchor wire, now trailing on the seabed astern of the
drifting rig, together with part of the NANUQ’s tow wire.
1915. The AIVIQ departs to sheltered waters to rig its
grappling equipment – probably a grapnel (named as a grapple
0031. AIVIQ, with the grapnel over the stern departs
sheltered water for the rig.
0110. ALERT successfully connects to the emergency towline
by recovering the end to the deck and putting a bowline in
it, and connecting it to their own towing gear. It starts to
tow the rig away from the shore.
0357. AIVIQ, is back on the location and at 0445
successfully grapples the No 8 anchor wire. There is no sign
of the NANUQ’s tow wire, or the connecting 150 ton SWL
0510. AIVIQ and ALERT now have the KULLUK under tow. They
are proceeding towards Port Hobron a safe harbour on the
Northeast side of Sitkalidak Island on instruction from the
Unified Command. This would require a tow of approximately
1131. GUARDSMAN is released
from the area with gearbox problems.
1336. Wind ESE 50+ knots. A four person salvage team is
lowered onto the rig from a Coast Guard helicopter.
1448. Salvage team is recovered to the helicopter due to
1530-1600. The master of the ALERT reported that he was
required to take evading action several times to avoid
collision with the AIVIQ.
1600. The KULLUK begins to pull both vessels backwards
towards Sitkalidak Island and so they increase power.
1624. Wind SE 40-50 knots. AIVIQ’s tow parts – at the 76mm
weak link. The ALERT is now being pulled astern by the rig.
By now the tug is attempting to influence where the rig will
go aground. The AIVIQ Master considers that there are no
other possible means by which the tow can be reconnected.
1815. The ALERT Master orders 100% power to influence the
speed of drift of the KULLUK, but due to engine alarms has
to reduce power to 85%.
2010. The ALERT releases the tow with the KULLUK 3 miles
from the shore on instruction from the Unified Command, by
spooling the tow wire off its drum..
2040. KULLUK grounds on a stretch of shoreline near Oceans
Bay, Sitkalidad Island.
THE INVESTIGATOR’S COMMENTS (A SUMMARY)
The investigators considered numerous points regarding the
incident, many of them concerned with the bollard pull
required for the tow, which based on studies carried out
over some years before the event would be 200 tons according
to the tow plan. However those who planned the move from the
beach onwards calculated that the required bollard pull
would be 282 tons.
Additionally while those engaged in towing in the Gulf of
Alaska were accustomed to allowing themselves to be pulled
astern in adverse weather, the routing of the KULLUK to did
not allow for this option.
The towing gear on the KULLUK also came in for some
criticism, since it had not been specifically assessed in
relation to the December tow. Of course the GL Noble Denton
warranty surveyor did not assess the towing arrangements
despite the fact that the contract between GL ND and Shell
stated that the former was hired ‘to provide warranty survey
and certificate of approval for the tow’.
Of course the 120 t SWL shackle which was the source of the
original loss of tow came in for considerable investigation
without any real result as far as we are able to tell, other
than the fact that it seemed to be what it purported to be.
All the shackles and sample new shackles of the same make
were tested to destruction after the event and it was
concluded that the cyclic loading might have caused fatigue.
A further section compares the shackles provided with the
possible requirements determined for this type of tow in the
‘US Navy Towing Manual’, and as we might expect they were
found to be less than adequate, although one might note that
the 85 T SWL shackle which remained in the emergency towing
system did not fail.
Then there was some discussion about the ‘dynamic loads’,
essentially the prevention of shock loading, and although
they have not been detailed in this summary there were
various lengths of chain in the towing systems which were
intended to reduce shock loading by means of enhancing the
catenary effect. There was some discussion about
‘stretchers’ although none were used. The report considers
that the watch keepers did not take appropriate action to
reduce the shock loading on the tow. On the other hand the
company had not provided any guidance for towing. Nor had
the Captain of the AIVIQ issued any specific instructions
about conducting the tow.
There is a review of the competence of the ship’s deck
officers, none of whom had worked in Alaskan waters during
the winter. The watch keepers were divided into two groups
each consisting one a regular mate and a 3rd Mate ‘Anchor
Captain’ . Each group worked for 12 hours at a stretch
(Illegal apparently in US ships) with the Captain being on
days. The report concludes that the watch keepers did not
take appropriate action to reduce the fluctuations in
tension in the towing system on December 27th.
The AIVIQ’s general condition came in for investigation and
it was found that there had previously been an complete
blackout and an engine failure while towing on a previous
occasion, and that some modifications were recommended by
the ship’s crew mainly dealing with the ingress of water
onto the working deck, into the winch houses and into the
safe areas. Specifically the installation of doors for the
safe deck area and the raising of the tank vents had not
been carried out prior to the departure for Seattle. Some of
the failures were required by law to be reported to the
Coast Guard but this had not been done.
After the casualty an engineering investigation was carried
out and it was determined that probably the fuel injectors
had been degraded over time and that therefore it was
probable that there had been water in the fuel in the past.
A petroleum test by DNV determined that there was 0.5% fuel
in the port day tank, and the engine manufacturers specified
a maximum water content of 0.05%.
The report contains a detailed description of the fuel
system, which is provided with four vents terminating 30”
above main deck level. These vents allowed water from the
main deck to enter the overflow tank and to quote the report
“The circuit breaker for the fuel oil overflow tank alarm
had been secured for unexplained reasons some time after
midnight on December 26th”. Once the overflow tank was full
it was possible for all tanks to be contaminated, including
the day tanks. The Chief Engineer did not apparently realize
this, even though his maintenance report suggested that the
deck vents needed fixing.
Also the ship was provided with a DPII system and the FMEA
for it had required that each engine be provided with fuel
from a different day tank. The configuration used was to
provide fuel for 2 engines from one tank and 2 from another.
The report goes on to discuss the weather at some length.
Well, what the people planning the tow should have read was
the short statement about the weather in the Alaska Pilot
book. It is contained in the report and is reproduced here:
The Aleutian Low looms over the North Pacific as a
climatic warning to mariners navigating the Alaskan waters.
This semi-permanent feature is made up of the day-to-day
storms that traverse these seas in a seemingly endless
procession. With these storms come rain, sleet, snow, the
howling winds and the mountainous seas that make the
northern Gulf of Alaska and the southern Bering Sea among
the most treacherous winter waters in the Northern
The report considers the limitations of the vessels called
to support the emergency and then goes into conclusions most
of which can be gathered from what has been written here.
The report them makes recommendations, several of which
determine that the Coast Guard should have a greater
oversight of towing activities, both in Alaskan waters and
It also suggests that Shell should do better in terms of
policies and procedures and criteria for towing operations,
and that Edison Chouest should put in place towing
procedures as part of its safety management system and
develop training processes for masters and mates and finally
that the engineering deficiencies of the AIVIQ should be
Unusually the investigators commend almost everyone actively
involved in the accident, mostly for their skill and
THE REVIEWER’S COMMENTS
For some reason the timings in the executive summary are not
the same as those in the main body of the report. Also all
names have been redacted from the report, except for the
name of the investigator and the Coast Guard Rear-Admirals.
It is likely that the multiple reviewers of the towing plan
were relying on some-one else to identify the deficiencies,
if there were any, and were probably unaware that the AIVIQ
was deficient in a number of respects. But there is no doubt
that some-one should have checked out the weather, the
required bollard pull, the available bollard pull and the
towing systems. And here we should remember that the towing
plan still showed 85 ton shackles in the system.
And now we come to the main player in the whole event, the
AIVIQ. The ship itself looks more like a wedding cake than
an offshore vessel, and some might consider it to be little
more than a vanity project, looking sleek on the outside but
with only 208 tons bollard pull available from 21000 bhp.
and virtually no freeboard aft. At the christening ceremony
some-one from Chouest is quoted as saying that it began as a
drawing on the back of a piece of paper. Well who would have
thought it. Anyone surprised by this statement might have a
look at the spec of the conventional anchor-handler ‘Olympic
Hercules’ which has 270 tons bollard pull available from
23000 bhp. It was built by Ulsteins in 2002. Current heavy
duty anchor-handlers built in Europe are often provided with
more than 30,000 bhp.
It is possible that at least some of the problems related to
the manner in which the AIVIQ was being operated. It appears
from the photographs in the report, and virtually all
photographs on the internet that the ship’s roller is
partially submerged at all times, giving a freeboard of
maybe 3 feet, or 1 metre. This situation has not been
commented on, so it is not known whether it is a requirement
to maintain stability or GOM custom and practice, continued
in error. On a ship of these vast dimensions a freeboard of
maybe 3 metres should be possible, if no underdeck drilling
supplies are being carried. More freeboard would have
resulted in less, or no, water in the fuel.
The towing equipment got a lot of space in the report,
particularly after the loss of the 120 ton shackle from the
towing plate. Of course this resulted in the weak link,
which is only included so that it will break if the system
is stressed and the rig can then recover the towing bridle,
becoming part of the AIVIQ’s system and it remained part of
it even when it was no longer required. There is a lot of
stuff about percentages of proof load for shackles included
in towing systems, but this may only be because large
shackles are sometimes too big to go through the eyes of
telurit splices, and therefore the wires should be
differently terminated or else Baldt or Kenter links used. I
don’t think we were told how the AIVIQ’s wire was
terminated, but the weak link was fitted with a spelter
socket. As far as shackles go, surely it is the bigger the
better, or even better use a Kenter link.
After the first loss of the tow everything else was a
contingency measure. Some of these measures worked quite
well, and some were ineffective.
The emergency towing system was effective. The AIVIQ managed
to pick it up OK and connect up, and it was only the failure
of the main engines which then gave major problems. It might
then have been fortunate that the thrusters, including the
2600 bhp azimuthing thruster were powered by the service
The first vessel to attempt to assist was the USCGC ALEX
HALEY, built in 1967 with 7000 bhp available and 104 people
on board. It attempted, unwisely in my view to take the
AIVIQ in tow, in adverse weather in the middle of the night.
This was an act of bravado, and the simplest calculation
would have determined that even if the connection had been
successful, the ship would have had little effect. It was
fortunate that the failure only resulted in the loss of one
of the Coast Guard cutter’s propellers. Worst case, either
ship could have been holed or both the screws of the Coast
Guard vessel and the azimuthing thruster of the AIVIQ put
out of action. The consequences do not bear thinking about.
The GUARDSMAN did quite a bit to stabilize the situation,
considering the age and dimensions of the vessel, and the
NANUQ also operated successfully within its capabilities,
and for a while things seemed to be going well. Was it a
good idea for the onshore team to instruct the vessels to
take the rig to the nearest safe harbour? It is difficult to
tell. Instinct would suggest that the primary objective
should have been to gain more sea room, but if the weather
was never going to get any better would there have been any
point? But looking at the weather charts included in the
report there might have been an opportunity for the tow to
gain sea room on 28th December but of course the tow was not
re-established until 29th.
When the ALERT joined the fray it was like the arrival of
the cavalry in a 1950s western. It bustled about and got on
with the job, and there is every chance that if the guys on
the AIVIQ had removed the weak link from their towing system
the situation would have been saved. Some might say that it
is easy to pontificate about this in hindsight, and it is,
but the point is that many opportunities to prevent the
problem from occurring at all were presented but ignored,
and in addition quite a few opportunities for recovery were
also presented, but due to poor advice or lack of equipment
these were missed.
The investigation raises the point that the whole process
was not subject to sufficient risk assessment, and if it had
been everything should have been different. But even without
any of that there are a few things which stand out. The
investigation points out that the emergency mooring system
could have been deployed before the rig was abandoned, or
even when the salvage team was briefly on board. A 15 ton
LWT with 900 ft of chain might have held the rig off the
beach. The NANUQ gave up when its tow wire failed, but it
was an anchor-handler and had been used as lead tug on a
previous tow. Did it not have a spare tow wire? The ALERT
was not mobilized until 29th December, so up to that moment
the vessel most capable of assisting with the recovery was
ignored. And maybe there were other equally suitable craft
out there which could have been hired. We don’t know.
These questions lead to consideration of the make-up of the
Shell Incident Management Team, whose first actions
according to the report were to locate possible assistance
towing vessels, hence it was they who sent out the GUARDSMAN
and the NANUQ. This was not too much of a stretch, since
both vessels were probably on hire to the company . On 28th
December the Shell team was enhanced to become a Unified
Command structure, according to the report to ‘co-ordinate
vessel response and potential oil recovery operations’. This
group apparently consisted of representation from Coast
Guard, Shell, Edison Chouest, Noble Drilling, State of
Alaska and Kodiak Borough. Was there a towing expert amongst
this large group? We do not know.
What we do know is that everyone involved in this misfortune
will have learnt some lessons, and the rest of us have the
opportunity of learning from their experience. The full
report is available on the USCG website HOMEPORT.
The KULLUK on the beach. USCG
Victor Gibson. April 2014.
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